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Abstract:	  	  This	  thesis	  addresses	  discrepancies	  in	  different	  interpretations	  of	  Just	  War	  Theory.	  As	  war	  is	  a	  monumental	  force	  that	  irreversibly	  alters	  the	  lives	  of	  millions	  of	  people	  every	  year,	  understanding	  the	  morality	  of	  war	  is	  crucial	  for	  understanding	  the	  world	  as	  it	  is	  and	  for	  determining	  how	  it	  should	  be.	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  compared	  two	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  philosopher’s	  interpretations	  of	  Just	  War	  Theory.	  I	  found	  that	  while	  neither	  view	  was	  completely	  satisfactory	  in	  explaining	  and	  justifying	  people’s	  intuitions	  about	  war,	  Michael	  Walzer’s	  view	  was	  superior	  to	  Jeff	  McMahan’s	  view	  in	  that	  it	  accommodates	  for	  practical	  issues	  such	  as	  explaining	  and	  allowing	  for	  the	  culture	  of	  “supporting	  our	  troops,”	  and	  that	  it	  is	  in	  line	  with	  international	  law	  in	  terms	  of	  who	  is	  and	  who	  is	  not	  a	  just	  target	  of	  war,	  and	  who	  is	  and	  who	  is	  not	  committing	  war	  crimes.	  This	  view	  has	  serious	  consequences	  concerning	  how	  soldiers	  and	  political	  leaders	  should	  conduct	  themselves	  and	  how	  they	  are	  allowed	  to	  act	  legally	  in	  times	  of	  war.	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The	  topic	  of	  war	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  heated	  issues	  that	  pertains	  to	  the	  human	  race,	  as	  it	  effects	  millions	  of	  people	  worldwide	  every	  year,	  and	  has	  done	  so	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  recorded	  human	  history.	  War	  is	  a	  monumental	  force	  that	  forever	  alters	  the	  lives	  of	  those	  who	  participate	  in	  them.	  It	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  the	  morality	  of	  war	  is	  a	  highly	  charged	  issue.	  The	  most	  common	  and	  indeed	  the	  most	  important	  questions	  concerning	  the	  morality	  of	  war	  are	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  war	  is	  just	  and	  who,	  if	  anyone,	  is	  responsible	  for	  unjust	  wars.	  Other	  important	  questions	  include	  how	  is	  it	  permissible	  to	  fight	  a	  war,	  and	  how	  is	  it	  permissible	  to	  end	  a	  war.	  The	  most	  common	  theory	  used	  to	  determine	  the	  justness	  of	  any	  particular	  war	  is	  Just	  War	  Theory.	  Just	  War	  Theory	  however,	  can	  be	  interpreted	  in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  ways.	  Two	  of	  the	  most	  famous	  interpretations	  come	  from	  Michael	  Walzer	  and	  from	  Jeff	  McMahan.	  These	  interpretations	  are	  not	  compatible	  with	  one	  another.	  The	  theory	  I	  tend	  to	  side	  with	  is	  Walzer’s.	  Although	  it	  is	  controversial	  in	  that	  it	  holds	  that	  soldiers	  are	  never	  guilty	  of	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  moral	  equality	  between	  combatants	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  a	  conflict,	  I	  think	  that	  this	  theory	  does	  a	  better	  job	  of	  taking	  real-­‐world	  situations	  into	  account.	  The	  discrepancies	  in	  the	  theories	  of	  McMahan	  and	  Walzer	  have	  serious	  real	  world	  implications.	  Depending	  on	  whose	  account	  of	  Just	  War	  Theory	  one	  sides	  with,	  one	  could	  hold	  radically	  different	  views	  as	  to	  who	  is	  allowed	  to	  fight	  in	  a	  war,	  what	  the	  moral	  responsibilities	  of	  soldiers	  are,	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  permissible	  to	  directly	  target	  civilians,	  etc..	  These	  are	  no	  trivial	  matters.	  Depending	  on	  which	  view	  one	  endorses,	  a	  soldier	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  simply	  just	  that,	  a	  soldier	  trying	  to	  do	  his	  job,	  who	  deserves	  the	  support	  of	  their	  nation,	  or	  as	  a	  person	  who	  is	  committing	  a	  serious	  crime,	  akin	  to	  murder,	  and	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  criminal	  for	  doing	  the	  exact	  same	  thing.	  Clearly	  then,	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it	  is	  an	  important	  issue	  to	  understand	  the	  discrepancies	  in	  these	  two	  accounts	  of	  Just	  War	  Theory,	  as	  they	  could	  implicate	  radical	  changes	  to	  the	  way	  our	  society	  is	  currently	  set	  up.	  Among	  philosophers,	  the	  most	  pervasive	  theory	  for	  determining	  the	  justness	  of	  a	  war	  is	  Just	  War	  Theory.	  Just	  War	  Theory	  is	  often	  also	  cited	  by	  political	  leaders,	  who	  are	  trying	  to	  explain	  why	  their	  country	  is	  just	  in	  fighting	  a	  war.	  For	  example,	  when	  George	  W.	  Bush	  announced	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Iraq	  war	  on	  March	  19,	  2003,	  he	  directly	  addressed	  two	  of	  the	  main	  tenets	  of	  Just	  War	  Theory,	  the	  principle	  of	  right	  intention	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  just	  cause,	  as	  justification	  of	  the	  war.	  Indeed	  many	  of	  the	  rules	  of	  Just	  War	  Theory	  have	  been	  codified	  into	  international	  law.	  The	  United	  Nations	  Charter,	  the	  Hague	  Conventions,	  and	  the	  Geneva	  Conventions,	  which	  are	  all	  considered	  to	  be	  pieces	  of	  international	  law,	  all	  have	  their	  foundations	  in	  Just	  War	  Theory.	  Just	  War	  Theory	  is	  generally	  divided	  into	  three	  parts:	  
jus	  ad	  bellum,	  jus	  in	  bello,	  and	  jus	  post	  bellum,	  which	  concern	  justice	  in	  going	  to	  war,	  justice	  in	  fighting	  the	  war,	  and	  justice	  in	  concluding	  the	  war	  respectively.	  	   Jus	  ad	  bellum	  concerns	  the	  morality	  of	  resorting	  to	  armed	  conflict	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Since	  it	  is	  the	  heads	  of	  state	  that	  are	  responsible	  for	  starting	  wars,	  they	  are	  typically	  the	  ones	  who	  are	  responsible	  for	  abiding	  by	  the	  principles	  of	  jus	  ad	  bellum.	  If	  they	  fail	  to	  abide	  by	  these	  principles,	  then	  these	  heads	  of	  state	  are	  guilty	  of	  committing	  war	  crimes.	  Although	  the	  tenets	  of	  Just	  War	  Theory	  can	  be	  divided	  up	  in	  different	  ways,	  I	  will	  discuss	  one	  of	  the	  most	  widely	  accepted	  ways	  to	  divide	  it,	  which	  is	  also	  the	  way	  it	  is	  presented	  in	  the	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy.	  According	  to	  this	  system,	  there	  are	  six	  principles	  of	  jus	  ad	  
bellum,	  all	  of	  which	  must	  be	  fulfilled	  in	  order	  for	  a	  head	  of	  state	  to	  rightly	  resort	  to	  war.	  The	  principles	  are:	  just	  cause,	  right	  intention,	  proper	  authority	  and	  public	  declaration,	  last	  resort,	  probability	  of	  success,	  and	  proportionality.	  The	  principle	  of	  just	  cause	  is	  perhaps	  the	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most	  important	  principle	  to	  fulfill	  in	  terms	  of	  having	  jus	  ad	  bellum,	  meaning	  that	  if	  a	  war	  is	  not	  started	  with	  just	  cause	  then	  it	  is	  not	  a	  just	  war.	  The	  most	  common	  and	  perhaps	  the	  only	  appropriate	  cases	  of	  just	  cause	  include	  defending	  one’s	  state	  against	  attack	  from	  another	  state,	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  innocent	  people	  from	  brutal	  regimes.	  Cases	  of	  defending	  one’s	  state	  are	  usually	  uncontroversial,	  as	  it	  is	  pretty	  much	  universally	  accepted	  that	  states	  have	  a	  right	  to	  their	  own	  self-­‐defense,	  and	  it	  is	  fairly	  easy	  to	  determine	  when	  a	  country	  is	  acting	  in	  self-­‐defense.	  For	  example,	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  entrance	  into	  World	  War	  Two	  in	  response	  to	  being	  attacked	  by	  Nazi	  Germany	  is	  a	  case	  where	  a	  country	  was	  invaded	  by	  another	  country	  committing	  an	  act	  of	  aggression,	  and	  justly	  responded	  by	  attacking	  the	  invading	  soldiers.	  Also,	  cases	  where	  a	  country	  takes	  to	  arms	  to	  defend	  a	  helpless	  peoples	  from	  a	  brutal	  regime	  are	  usually	  considered	  to	  be	  just	  (if	  that	  is	  the	  true	  and	  only	  reason	  that	  the	  country	  takes	  to	  arms).	  A	  good	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  humanitarian	  intervention	  that	  happened	  during	  the	  Libyan	  Civil	  War	  in	  2011,	  where	  a	  coalition	  of	  many	  nations	  intervened	  militarily	  in	  response	  to	  reports	  by	  Amnesty	  International	  that	  the	  Libyan	  government	  was	  committing	  atrocities	  such	  as	  targeting	  paramedics	  who	  were	  trying	  to	  aid	  protestors	  who	  had	  been	  fired	  upon	  by	  the	  government,	  and	  other	  reports	  that	  the	  government	  was	  using	  ambulances	  in	  their	  attacks	  (so	  that	  people	  would	  think	  that	  they	  were	  paramedics,	  not	  soldiers)	  and	  raiding	  hospitals	  to	  kill	  wounded	  rebels	  .	  If	  a	  war	  is	  started	  for	  other	  reasons,	  such	  as	  to	  expand	  a	  nation’s	  territory,	  or	  to	  exert	  influence	  over	  neighboring	  states,	  then	  that	  state	  does	  not	  have	  just	  cause	  and	  instead	  is	  guilty	  of	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression.	  An	  act	  of	  aggression	  is	  an	  international	  crime.	  In	  fact,	  article	  one	  of	  the	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  states	  that	  one	  of	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  is	  “for	  the	  suppression	  of	  acts	  of	  aggression	  or	  other	  breaches	  of	  the	  peace.”	  The	  right	  intention	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principle	  means	  that	  a	  state	  that	  goes	  to	  war	  must	  be	  doing	  so	  only	  with	  the	  intentions	  of	  the	  just	  cause	  in	  mind;	  a	  state	  can’t	  use	  a	  just	  cause	  to	  merely	  cover	  up	  true	  intentions	  of	  land-­‐grabbing,	  ethnic	  cleansing,	  or	  anything	  else	  of	  the	  sort.	  George	  W.	  Bush	  directly	  addressed	  this	  principle	  in	  his	  March	  19,	  2003	  speech	  in	  which	  he	  announced	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Iraq	  War	  when	  he	  said,	  “America	  faces	  an	  enemy	  who	  has	  no	  regard	  for	  conventions	  of	  war	  or	  rules	  of	  morality.	  Saddam	  Hussein	  has	  placed	  Iraqi	  troops	  and	  equipment	  in	  civilian	  areas,	  attempting	  to	  use	  innocent	  men,	  women	  and	  children	  as	  shields	  for	  his	  own	  military.	  A	  final	  atrocity	  against	  his	  people… we	  have	  no	  ambition	  in	  Iraq,	  except	  to	  remove	  a	  threat,	  and	  restore	  control	  of	  that	  country	  to	  its	  own	  people.”	  The	  right	  intention	  principle	  ties	  in	  with	  the	  just	  cause	  principle,	  as	  if	  a	  country	  goes	  to	  war	  without	  the	  right	  intention,	  then	  they	  do	  not	  have	  just	  cause.	  Proper	  authority	  and	  public	  declaration	  mean	  that	  the	  war	  has	  to	  be	  started	  through	  legitimate	  means,	  namely	  that	  the	  heads	  of	  state	  publicly	  declare	  the	  war	  through	  the	  means	  that	  are	  outlined	  in	  that	  country’s	  laws	  or	  constitution.	  Last	  resort	  means	  that	  the	  country	  going	  to	  war	  has	  exhausted	  all	  other	  plausible	  means	  of	  peaceful	  arbitration.	  The	  probability	  of	  success	  principle	  states	  that	  a	  state	  cannot	  justly	  resort	  to	  war	  unless	  it	  can	  foresee	  some	  measurable	  impact	  on	  the	  situation.	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  principle	  is	  to	  avoid	  mass	  violence	  in	  cases	  where	  it	  will	  be	  futile.	  The	  last	  principle	  that	  must	  be	  satisfied	  to	  have	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  is	  proportionality.	  Proportionality	  means	  that	  a	  state	  must	  weigh	  the	  universal	  risks	  against	  the	  universal	  benefits	  that	  are	  expected	  to	  come	  of	  the	  war.	  This	  means	  that	  a	  state	  must	  tally	  the	  expected	  harms	  and	  benefits	  of	  both	  countries,	  not	  just	  their	  own.	  Only	  if	  there	  is	  an	  expected	  universal	  net	  benefit	  can	  the	  war	  be	  just.	  Only	  if	  all	  the	  aforementioned	  criteria	  are	  satisfied	  can	  a	  state	  have	  jus	  ad	  bellum.	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   Even	  if	  a	  war	  was	  started	  with	  all	  the	  right	  reasons,	  and	  is	  said	  to	  be	  just	  in	  its	  start,	  the	  states	  involved	  still	  must	  have	  proper	  conduct	  in	  the	  fighting	  of	  the	  war	  in	  order	  for	  the	  war	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  just.	  Like	  jus	  ad	  bellum,	  there	  are	  six	  criteria	  that	  must	  be	  met	  in	  order	  to	  have	  jus	  in	  bello.	  The	  six	  criteria	  for	  jus	  in	  bello	  are	  to	  obey	  all	  international	  laws	  on	  weapons	  prohibitions,	  to	  have	  discrimination	  and	  non-­‐combatant	  immunity,	  proportionality,	  benevolent	  quarantine	  for	  prisoners	  of	  war,	  no	  means	  which	  are	  mala	  en	  se,	  and	  no	  reprisals.	  The	  obeying	  of	  international	  prohibitions	  on	  certain	  weapons	  is	  pretty	  straightforward.	  If	  the	  international	  community	  has	  banned	  the	  use	  of	  mustard	  gas,	  then	  clearly	  it	  is	  not	  just	  to	  go	  ahead	  and	  use	  it	  anyways.	  Indeed,	  the	  use	  of	  mustard	  gas	  and	  many	  other	  types	  of	  weapons	  have	  been	  banned	  in	  international	  law.	  Mustard	  gas	  is	  specifically	  banned	  in	  the	  First	  Hague	  Convention,	  declaration	  IV,2,	  and	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Hague	  conventions,	  other	  weapons	  are	  banned	  as	  well.	  Clearly,	  violating	  these	  prohibitions	  means	  violating	  the	  tenets	  of	  jus	  in	  bello.	  To	  discriminate	  and	  have	  non-­‐combatant	  immunity	  means	  that	  you	  are	  only	  going	  to	  war	  with	  the	  people	  engaged	  in	  the	  war.	  A	  soldier	  is	  not	  allowed	  to	  just	  shoot	  any	  citizen	  of	  the	  country	  with	  which	  they	  are	  at	  war,	  they	  are	  only	  allowed	  to	  directly	  target	  legitimate	  military,	  political,	  or	  industrial	  targets,	  which	  are	  involved	  with	  the	  war	  effort.	  This	  is	  specifically	  codified	  in	  international	  law	  in	  article	  three	  of	  the	  Geneva	  Convention,	  which	  states	  that	  “Persons	  taking	  no	  active	  part	  in	  the	  hostilities,	  including	  members	  of	  armed	  forces	  who	  have	  laid	  down	  their	  arms	  and	  those	  placed	  '	  hors	  de	  combat	  '	  by	  sickness,	  wounds,	  detention,	  or	  any	  other	  cause,	  shall	  in	  all	  circumstances	  be	  treated	  humanely,	  without	  any	  adverse	  distinction	  founded	  on	  race,	  colour,	  religion	  or	  faith,	  sex,	  birth	  or	  wealth,	  or	  any	  other	  similar	  criteria.”	  This	  article	  further	  goes	  on	  to	  specifically	  prohibit	  violence	  against	  these	  people.	  Sometimes	  in	  war,	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there	  are	  civilian	  causalities,	  which	  can	  be	  excusable,	  but	  only	  if	  they	  are	  collateral	  damage	  to	  a	  legitimate	  target,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  reasonable	  way	  of	  attacking	  that	  legitimate	  target	  without	  harming	  them.	  For	  example,	  it	  can	  be	  excusable	  for	  a	  country	  to	  bomb	  a	  munitions	  factory	  that	  is	  working	  for	  the	  opposing	  country’s	  war	  effort,	  which	  may	  result	  in	  the	  death	  of	  some	  civilians	  working	  there,	  but	  the	  civilians	  cannot	  be	  the	  direct	  target	  of	  the	  bombing,	  and	  care	  must	  be	  taken	  to	  avoid	  these	  civilian	  casualties	  if	  possible.	  Proportionality	  in	  this	  case	  means	  that	  soldiers	  can	  only	  use	  force	  appropriate	  to	  the	  end	  they	  seek.	  For	  example,	  it	  would	  be	  unjust	  to	  drop	  a	  nuclear	  bomb	  to	  destroy	  one	  small	  munitions	  factory.	  	  Benevolent	  quarantine	  for	  prisoners	  of	  war	  is	  another	  straightforward	  criteria.	  The	  motivation	  behind	  this	  is	  that	  once	  an	  enemy	  soldier	  gets	  taken	  prisoner,	  they	  cease	  to	  be	  lethal	  threats	  and	  thus	  they	  should	  be	  treated	  without	  malevolence,	  and	  should	  be	  exchanged	  with	  your	  own	  countries’	  POWs	  when	  the	  fighting	  ceases.	  This	  benevolent	  quarantine	  clause	  is	  also	  codified	  in	  international	  law,	  specifically	  in	  articles	  4	  through	  7	  of	  the	  Geneva	  Convention.	  	  No	  means	  mala	  en	  se	  means	  that	  no	  means	  that	  are	  evil	  in	  and	  of	  themselves	  should	  be	  used	  to	  help	  end	  a	  conflict.	  Examples	  of	  things	  considered	  evil	  in	  and	  of	  themselves	  are	  mass	  rape	  campaigns,	  genocide,	  disguising	  soldiers	  as	  Red	  Cross	  workers,	  or	  other	  such	  treacheries.	  No	  reprisals	  means	  that	  even	  if	  country	  A	  violates	  jus	  in	  
bello	  against	  country	  B,	  country	  B	  still	  does	  not	  have	  the	  right	  to	  violate	  jus	  in	  bello	  against	  country	  A	  so	  that	  they	  would	  be	  on	  equal	  standing,	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  tenets	  of	  jus	  in	  bello	  must	  be	  followed	  at	  all	  times.	  	  	   The	  third	  and	  final	  set	  of	  criteria	  that	  must	  be	  met	  in	  order	  to	  fight	  a	  just	  war	  are	  the	  criteria	  of	  jus	  post	  bellum,	  which	  include	  proportionality	  and	  publicity,	  rights	  vindication,	  discrimination,	  punishment	  #1,	  punishment	  #2,	  compensation,	  and	  rehabilitation.	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Proportionality	  and	  publicity	  mean	  that	  the	  resulting	  peace	  should	  be	  reasonable	  and	  publicly	  proclaimed.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  losing	  country	  should	  not	  be	  subjected	  to	  any	  unreasonable	  post-­‐war	  punishments	  and	  that	  the	  terms	  of	  that	  country’s	  surrender	  should	  be	  publically	  known.	  A	  historical	  example	  of	  why	  this	  is	  important	  is	  post	  WWI	  Germany.	  After	  Germany	  lost	  the	  war,	  they	  had	  many	  post-­‐war	  military	  and	  economic	  punishments.	  This	  caused	  the	  German	  economy	  to	  collapse	  and	  set	  the	  stage	  so	  to	  speak	  for	  Hitler’s	  rise	  to	  power.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  reasons	  that	  enabled	  Hitler’s	  rise	  to	  power	  is	  that	  he	  successfully	  stirred	  up	  German	  nationalism	  by	  criticizing	  the	  unfair	  terms	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Versailles	  (which	  ended	  World	  War	  One).	  His	  harsh	  criticism	  for	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Versailles	  also	  successfully	  garnered	  him	  national	  support	  for	  his	  unjust	  invasions	  of	  Poland	  and	  Russia.	  In	  other	  words,	  placing	  unreasonable	  post-­‐war	  punishments	  on	  Germany	  after	  World	  War	  One,	  was	  a	  significant	  contributing	  factor	  to	  the	  outbreak	  of	  World	  War	  Two.	  Rights	  vindication	  means	  that	  the	  settlement	  of	  the	  war	  should	  secure	  the	  rights	  violations	  which	  triggered	  the	  war	  in	  the	  first	  place	  and	  that	  this	  should	  be	  the	  main	  substantive	  goal	  of	  the	  postwar	  agreements.	  Discrimination	  means	  that	  discrimination	  should	  be	  made	  between	  the	  leaders,	  the	  soldiers,	  and	  the	  civilians	  of	  the	  losing	  party.	  Civilians	  should	  be	  relatively	  immune	  to	  postwar	  sanctions,	  which	  means	  that	  it	  is	  unjust	  to	  make	  sweeping	  socioeconomic	  changes	  as	  a	  form	  of	  post	  war	  punishment.	  Punishment	  #1	  is	  for	  when	  the	  defeated	  country	  has	  been	  a	  blatant	  aggressor.	  In	  this	  case,	  (proportional)	  punishment	  is	  necessary	  which	  means	  that	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  losing	  country	  are	  to	  stand	  fair	  trial	  for	  war	  crimes.	  Punishment	  #2	  is	  for	  when	  soldiers	  commit	  atrocities,	  in	  which	  case	  any	  guilty	  party	  (from	  either	  side)	  should	  be	  tried	  for	  their	  crimes.	  Compensation	  means	  that	  discriminate	  and	  proportional	  economic	  sanctions	  may	  be	  mandated	  on	  the	  losing	  country,	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but	  these	  cannot	  be	  so	  severe	  as	  to	  tamper	  with	  the	  defeated	  country’s	  reconstruction	  efforts	  (which	  we	  know	  to	  be	  important	  from	  the	  aforementioned	  example	  of	  post	  WWI	  Germany).	  Rehabilitation	  means	  that	  the	  institutions	  of	  the	  aggressive	  regime	  may	  be	  reformed.	  This	  can	  include	  demilitarization,	  judicial	  retraining,	  human	  rights	  training,	  and	  even	  deep	  structural	  changes	  to	  the	  government.	  	   While	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  material	  covered	  by	  Just	  War	  Theory	  is	  controversial,	  Just	  War	  Theory	  itself	  is	  still	  the	  standard	  by	  which	  we	  measure	  the	  ethics	  of	  an	  armed	  conflict.	  Most	  of	  what	  is	  contained	  in	  Just	  War	  Theory	  has	  also	  been	  codified	  into	  international	  law,	  which	  means	  that	  it	  is	  mandatory	  for	  knowing	  before	  one	  heads	  into	  an	  armed	  conflict.	  The	  aim	  of	  Just	  War	  Theory	  is	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  momentous	  occasion	  of	  war	  only	  occurs	  in	  the	  very	  few	  cases	  in	  which	  it	  is	  justified	  and	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  rules	  concerning	  just	  conduct	  and	  just	  ends	  to	  the	  war	  are	  followed.	  	   Just	  War	  Theory	  can	  be	  interpreted	  in	  many	  different	  ways.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  interpretations	  is	  that	  of	  Michael	  Walzer,	  as	  laid	  out	  in	  his	  book	  Just	  and	  Unjust	  Wars.	  According	  to	  Walzer,	  a	  war	  can	  be	  unjust	  in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  ways,	  which	  include:	  aggressive	  wars,	  and	  non-­‐aggressive	  wars	  in	  which	  one	  or	  both	  sides	  are	  committing	  atrocities.	  Something	  that	  is	  unique	  and	  controversial	  about	  Walzer’s	  interpretation	  is	  that	  according	  to	  Walzer,	  the	  concepts	  of	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  and	  jus	  in	  bello	  are	  completely	  distinct.	  This	  basically	  means	  that	  even	  if	  a	  country	  is	  fighting	  a	  war	  without	  jus	  
ad	  bellum	  on	  their	  side,	  they	  can	  still	  achieve	  jus	  in	  bello.	  He	  thinks	  that	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  only	  allows	  us	  to	  make	  judgments	  about	  aggression	  and	  self-­‐defense	  while	  jus	  in	  bello	  is	  only	  about	  the	  observance	  or	  violation	  of	  the	  “customary	  and	  positive	  rules	  of	  engagement.”	  (Walzer,	  21).	  Walzer	  readily	  acknowledges	  that	  this	  view	  is	  controversial	  and	  that	  some	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controversial	  claims	  follow	  from	  it	  when	  he	  says	  “The	  dualism	  of	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  and	  jus	  in	  
bello	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  all	  that	  is	  most	  problematic	  in	  the	  moral	  reality	  of	  war.”	  (Walzer,	  21).	  One	  of	  the	  most	  controversial	  claims	  that	  follows	  from	  this	  way	  of	  thinking	  is	  that	  soldiers	  are	  never	  responsible	  for	  starting	  any	  specific	  war	  and	  thus	  can	  never	  be	  guilty	  of	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression.	  In	  other	  words,	  soldiers	  cannot	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  violating	  the	  principles	  of	  jus	  ad	  bellum.	  Walzer	  still	  of	  course	  believes	  that	  soldiers	  are	  responsible	  for	  their	  own	  conduct	  in	  war	  and	  therefore	  are	  responsible	  for	  any	  crimes	  that	  were	  committed	  in	  the	  actual	  fighting	  of	  the	  war.	  In	  other	  words,	  while	  soldiers	  cannot	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  violating	  the	  principles	  of	  jus	  ad	  bellum,	  they	  are	  still	  responsible	  for	  their	  actions	  in	  war	  and	  can	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  violating	  the	  principles	  of	  jus	  in	  bello.	  	   According	  to	  Walzer,	  the	  main	  crime	  that	  is	  committed	  in	  the	  actual	  starting	  of	  the	  war	  is	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression.	  Walzer	  defines	  aggression	  as	  the	  use	  of	  armed	  force	  by	  one	  state	  against	  another	  state	  without	  the	  justification	  of	  self-­‐defense.	  What	  Walzer	  finds	  so	  morally	  reprehensible	  about	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression	  is	  that	  it	  forces	  people	  to	  fight	  for	  their	  lives	  against	  their	  own	  will.	  As	  Walzer	  sees	  it,	  this	  forcing	  people	  to	  fight	  for	  their	  lives	  is	  morally	  equivalent	  to	  people	  being	  forced	  to	  give	  up	  their	  fundamental	  rights.	  This	  is	  because	  Walzer	  thinks	  that	  individuals	  have	  a	  fundamental	  right	  to	  life	  and	  to	  political	  association.	  He	  thinks	  that	  a	  state	  is	  the	  means	  by	  which	  this	  political	  association	  is	  protected.	  He	  also	  thinks	  that	  aggression	  violates	  the	  rights	  of	  life	  and	  political	  association	  (because	  when	  an	  aggressor	  state	  commits	  the	  act	  of	  aggression,	  they	  are	  directly	  threatening	  the	  lives	  and	  the	  political	  associations	  of	  the	  victim	  country’s	  citizens)	  and	  therefore,	  aggression	  violates	  the	  rights	  of	  each	  citizen	  of	  the	  victim	  country.	  Basically,	  he	  thinks	  that	  an	  act	  of	  aggression	  amounts	  to	  forcing	  the	  citizens	  of	  the	  victim	  nation	  to	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choose	  between	  “your	  rights,	  or	  (some	  of)	  your	  lives”	  (Walzer,	  51).	  He	  does	  not	  think	  that	  when	  the	  victim	  country’s	  soldiers	  open	  fire,	  against	  the	  aggressive	  country’s	  soldiers,	  they	  are	  committing	  an	  act	  of	  aggression.	  Rather,	  the	  initial	  act	  of	  aggression	  gives	  them	  the	  choice	  to	  either	  put	  their	  lives	  in	  jeopardy	  or	  give	  up	  their	  rights.	  If	  and	  when	  these	  people	  choose	  to	  fight,	  Walzer	  thinks	  “they	  are	  always	  just	  in	  fighting;	  and	  in	  most	  cases,	  given	  that	  harsh	  choice,	  fighting	  is	  the	  morally	  preferred	  response.”	  (Walzer,	  51).	  These	  soldiers	  are	  not	  committing	  acts	  of	  aggression,	  it	  is	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  initially	  aggressive	  country	  which	  forced	  the	  victim	  country’s	  citizens	  to	  fight.	  Walzer	  also	  notes	  that	  aggression	  is	  unique	  in	  that	  it	  is	  the	  only	  crime	  one	  state	  can	  commit	  against	  another	  state.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression	  violates	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  victim	  country’s	  statehood,	  while	  other	  war	  crimes,	  such	  as	  using	  banned	  weapons,	  only	  violate	  the	  rights	  of	  some	  particular	  individuals,	  not	  the	  state	  as	  a	  whole.	  As	  Walzer	  puts	  it,	  “all	  aggressive	  acts	  have	  one	  thing	  in	  common:	  they	  justify	  forceful	  resistance,	  and	  force	  cannot	  be	  used	  between	  nations,	  as	  it	  often	  can	  between	  persons,	  without	  putting	  life	  itself	  at	  risk.”	  (Walzer,	  52).	  This	  is	  important	  because	  it	  solidifies	  the	  right	  for	  the	  states	  that	  have	  been	  wronged	  to	  have	  the	  means	  to	  protect	  themselves.	  	  Once	  a	  state	  has	  been	  attacked	  (or	  an	  act	  of	  aggression	  has	  been	  committed	  against	  that	  state),	  then	  that	  state	  has	  the	  right	  to	  use	  arms	  to	  defend	  itself.	  The	  retaliation	  against	  the	  initial	  aggressor	  state	  is	  not	  considered	  an	  act	  of	  aggression,	  but	  rather	  an	  appropriate	  response	  to	  an	  act	  of	  aggression.	  It	  is	  still	  the	  aggressive	  state	  that	  has	  the	  moral	  burden	  of	  laying	  down	  their	  arms	  and	  seeking	  a	  peaceful	  resolution	  to	  the	  situation.	  Still	  though,	  Walzer	  thinks	  that	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression	  is	  a	  distinct	  phenomena	  from	  the	  principles	  of	  jus	  in	  bello	  (Walzer,	  21).	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   One	  of	  the	  most	  controversial	  of	  Walzer’s	  claims	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  soldiers	  are	  never	  responsible	  for	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression.	  Rather,	  Walzer	  maintains	  that	  heads	  of	  state	  are	  the	  sole	  people	  who	  are	  to	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression.	  Walzer	  makes	  the	  claim	  that	  all	  wars	  boil	  down	  to	  a	  dispute	  about	  governance.	  He	  also	  states	  that	  soldiers	  are	  not	  the	  ones	  who	  start	  the	  war,	  but	  rather	  that	  they	  are	  the	  means	  by	  which	  political	  entities	  choose	  to	  fight.	  The	  main	  reason	  that	  Walzer	  thinks	  that	  soldiers	  are	  not	  morally	  responsible	  for	  violating	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  is	  that	  Walzer	  believes	  that	  soldiers	  (other	  than	  mercenaries)	  never	  truly	  consent	  to	  go	  to	  war.	  This	  is	  highly	  controversial	  because	  many	  people	  think	  that	  if	  somebody	  volunteers	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  soldier,	  then	  they	  obviously	  (even	  if	  it	  is	  only	  hypothetically)	  consent	  to	  go	  to	  war.	  Therefore,	  it	  logically	  follows	  that	  volunteer	  armies	  consent	  to	  go	  to	  war	  and	  therefore	  can	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  violating	  the	  principles	  of	  jus	  ad	  bellum.	  Walzer	  however	  maintains	  that,	  where	  there	  is	  a	  common	  cause,	  there	  is	  no	  consent.	  To	  help	  support	  this	  point,	  Walzer	  quotes	  the	  philosopher	  T.H.	  Green,	  who	  said,	  “the	  power	  of	  the	  state	  compel.	  This	  is	  equally	  true	  whether	  the	  army	  is	  raised	  by	  voluntary	  enlistment	  or	  by	  conscription.”	  (Walzer,	  28).	  Walzer	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  say	  “For	  the	  state	  decrees	  that	  an	  army	  of	  a	  certain	  size	  be	  raised,	  and	  it	  sets	  out	  to	  find	  the	  necessary	  men,	  using	  all	  the	  techniques	  of	  coercion	  and	  persuasion	  at	  its	  disposal.”	  (Walzer,	  28).	  What	  Walzer	  is	  suggesting	  is	  that	  even	  if	  an	  army	  is	  made	  up	  of	  “volunteers,”	  these	  are	  not	  volunteers	  in	  the	  true	  sense	  as	  they	  are	  subjected	  to	  a	  tremendous	  amount	  of	  political	  and	  social	  pressure	  to	  enlist	  and	  therefore	  they	  can	  never	  truly	  consent	  to	  going	  to	  war.	  Walzer	  maintains	  that	  even	  the	  people	  who	  volunteer	  their	  service	  are	  subject	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  duty,	  patriotism,	  and	  even	  possibly	  a	  fear	  of	  ostracism	  if	  they	  do	  not	  enlist.	  Walzer	  argues	  in	  support	  of	  this	  view	  by	  comparing	  standard	  soldiers	  to	  aristocratic	  mercenaries.	  Walzer	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argues	  that	  these	  mercenaries	  enlisted	  either	  to	  try	  to	  gain	  personal	  or	  political	  clout,	  or	  simply	  because	  they	  loved	  the	  thrill	  of	  the	  fight.	  He	  argues	  that	  these	  men	  were	  not	  forced	  to	  fight	  in	  any	  sense	  of	  the	  word	  and	  also	  thinks	  that	  they	  are	  unique	  in	  that	  they	  can	  choose	  to	  stop	  fighting	  at	  any	  time	  with	  no	  serious	  consequences.	  Walzer	  makes	  the	  case	  that	  a	  war	  where	  mercenaries	  are	  the	  only	  participants,	  would	  not	  be	  so	  hellish,	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  were	  not	  coerced	  to	  fight	  and	  that	  they	  can	  stop	  fighting	  at	  any	  time.	  Walzer	  then	  makes	  the	  case	  that	  “Our	  judgments	  are	  very	  different,	  however,	  if	  the	  mercenary	  armies	  are	  recruited	  (as	  they	  most	  often	  are)	  from	  among	  desperately	  impoverished	  men,	  who	  can	  find	  no	  other	  way	  of	  feeding	  themselves	  and	  their	  families	  except	  by	  signing	  up.”	  (Walzer,	  27).	  In	  this	  example,	  the	  army	  made	  of	  impoverished	  men	  is	  supposed	  to	  represent	  the	  traditional	  soldiers,	  as	  it	  illustrates	  the	  extreme	  pressures	  that	  are	  on	  these	  soldiers	  that	  compel	  them	  to	  “volunteer”	  their	  service.	  This	  example	  is	  supposed	  to	  illustrate	  that	  the	  consent	  to	  go	  to	  war	  is	  not	  given	  freely	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  be	  considered	  true	  consent.	  Walzer	  points	  out	  that	  in	  the	  modern	  era,	  people	  virtually	  never	  volunteer	  to	  be	  a	  soldier	  out	  of	  pure	  choice.	  Instead,	  Walzer	  thinks	  that	  virtually	  all	  of	  the	  soldiers	  in	  today’s	  age	  enlist	  because	  of	  some	  sense	  of	  duty,	  or	  in	  alignment	  with	  some	  common	  cause,	  which	  means	  that	  they	  do	  not	  truly	  consent	  to	  fight	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  be	  guilty	  of	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression.	  Walzer	  states	  “What	  is	  important	  here	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  war	  (as	  a	  profession)	  or	  combat	  (at	  this	  or	  that	  moment	  in	  time)	  is	  a	  personal	  choice	  that	  the	  soldier	  makes	  on	  his	  own	  and	  for	  essentially	  private	  reasons.	  That	  kind	  of	  choosing	  effectively	  disappears	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  fighting	  becomes	  a	  legal	  obligation	  and	  a	  patriotic	  duty.”	  (Walzer,	  28).	  Walzer	  also	  thinks	  that	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  have	  this	  sense	  of	  duty,	  as	  we	  are	  raised	  in	  a	  culture	  in	  which	  fighting	  for	  your	  rights	  are	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  duty.	  Fighting	  for	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your	  country’s	  cause	  is	  taught	  to	  us	  as	  a	  virtue	  and	  it	  is	  popularly	  reinforced	  all	  the	  time	  in	  our	  culture:	  where	  we	  are	  always	  encouraged	  to	  “support	  our	  troops.”	  	  Our	  culture	  does	  reinforce	  a	  patriotic	  sense	  of	  duty,	  and	  I	  think	  that	  it	  is	  a	  reason	  that	  many	  people	  choose	  to	  enlist.	  Perhaps	  most	  important	  to	  this	  sense	  of	  duty	  are	  slogans	  like	  “freedom	  isn’t	  free,”	  which	  serve	  to	  constantly	  remind	  us	  that	  our	  rights	  and	  liberties	  are	  things	  that	  have	  to	  be	  fought	  for.	  These	  constant	  reminders	  are	  meant	  to	  keep	  people	  from	  becoming	  complacent,	  and	  imply	  that	  if	  there	  are	  not	  enough	  active	  soldiers	  to	  protect	  our	  rights,	  then	  we	  will	  all	  lose	  them.	  This	  gives	  some	  citizens	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  duty	  that	  they	  must	  enlist	  to	  protect	  all	  of	  our	  society’s	  ideals.	  Also,	  there	  is	  a	  valid	  case	  for	  people	  feeling	  ostracized	  if	  they	  do	  not	  commit	  to	  military	  service.	  During	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  people	  who	  actively	  tried	  to	  avoid	  military	  draft	  were	  dubbed	  “draft	  dodgers”	  and	  were	  thought	  of	  as	  cowards	  and	  people	  who	  should	  not	  be	  accepted,	  as	  they	  were	  not	  working	  towards	  the	  common	  goal.	  Many	  such	  people	  moved	  to	  Canada	  or	  Europe	  to	  escape	  the	  ostracism.	  Even	  today,	  although	  there	  is	  no	  draft	  in	  effect,	  a	  failure	  to	  register	  for	  selective	  service	  (in	  cases	  of	  a	  possible	  future	  draft)	  can	  result	  in	  being	  sentenced	  to	  up	  to	  5	  years	  in	  prison,	  and	  a	  fine	  of	  up	  to	  $10,000	  as	  per	  the	  Military	  Selective	  Service	  Act.	  As	  for	  people	  who	  are	  already	  enlisted	  in	  the	  armed	  forces	  and	  actively	  try	  to	  escape	  battle,	  they	  are	  dubbed	  deserters	  and	  can	  be	  subject	  to	  dishonorable	  discharge	  which	  would	  result	  in	  them	  losing	  all	  of	  their	  veteran’s	  benefits	  (even	  if	  they	  had	  a	  long	  career	  of	  honorable	  service	  prior	  to	  that),	  and	  being	  discriminated	  against,	  as	  a	  dishonorable	  discharge	  is	  considered	  shameful	  and	  can	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	  find	  employment,	  as	  it	  carries	  a	  social	  stigma	  similar	  to	  being	  convicted	  of	  a	  felony.	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   Perhaps	  the	  best	  historical	  example	  of	  a	  person	  who	  shows	  that	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  and	  
jus	  in	  bello	  are	  truly	  distinct	  concepts	  is	  Nazi	  Field	  Marshal	  Erwin	  Rommel.	  Rommel	  is	  renowned	  by	  historians	  and	  biographers	  for	  fighting	  a	  bad	  war	  well.	  There	  is	  virtually	  no	  debate	  as	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  war	  that	  Rommel	  was	  fighting	  was	  just.	  It	  is	  pretty	  much	  universally	  agreed	  that	  World	  War	  Two	  was	  an	  unjust	  war	  (on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  Axis),	  started	  by	  an	  act	  of	  aggression	  by	  Germany.	  Despite	  that	  however,	  Rommel	  is	  praised	  by	  most	  historians	  for	  fighting	  this	  evil	  war	  with	  just	  means.	  In	  his	  discussion	  of	  Rommel,	  Walzer	  states	  that	  “While	  many	  of	  his	  colleagues	  and	  peers	  in	  the	  German	  army	  surrendered	  their	  honor	  by	  collusion	  with	  the	  iniquities	  of	  Nazism,	  Rommel	  was	  never	  defiled.	  He	  concentrated,	  like	  the	  professional	  he	  was,	  on	  ‘the	  soldier’s	  task	  of	  fighting’	  and	  when	  he	  fought,	  he	  maintained	  the	  rules	  of	  war.”	  (Walzer,	  38).	  It	  is	  undeniable	  that	  Rommel	  fought	  the	  war	  adhering	  to	  all	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  jus	  in	  bello.	  The	  soldiers	  that	  were	  under	  Rommel’s	  command	  were	  never	  accused	  of	  committing	  any	  war	  crimes.	  In	  fact,	  the	  prisoners	  of	  war	  that	  Rommel	  took	  all	  reported	  as	  having	  been	  treated	  humanely.	  This	  also	  was	  at	  a	  time	  where	  there	  was	  a	  culture	  and	  expectation	  in	  Germany	  of	  subjecting	  POWs	  to	  horrible	  conditions.	  One	  of	  the	  things	  that	  Rommel	  is	  praised	  for	  the	  most	  is	  his	  burning	  of	  Hitler’s	  Commando	  Order	  of	  October,	  28,	  1942.	  That	  order	  stated	  explicitly	  that	  all	  soldiers	  that	  were	  found	  behind	  German	  lines	  were	  to	  be	  killed	  on	  sight.	  Rommel	  also	  famously	  ignored	  commands	  to	  capture	  and	  kill	  Jewish	  soldiers	  and	  civilians	  in	  the	  territories	  in	  which	  he	  was	  fighting.	  Rommel	  knew	  that	  ignoring	  these	  orders	  put	  himself	  at	  great	  personal	  risk,	  as	  Hitler	  had	  a	  track	  record	  of	  eliminating	  people	  who	  would	  not	  follow	  his	  every	  order.	  Still	  though,	  Rommel	  refused	  to	  commit	  these	  atrocities.	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  in	  my	  mind,	  and	  Rommel’s	  biographers	  tend	  to	  agree,	  that	  Rommel	  should	  be	  praised	  for	  his	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conduct	  in	  the	  actual	  fighting	  of	  the	  war.	  Walzer	  makes	  a	  strong	  point	  when	  he	  says	  “it	  would	  be	  very	  odd	  to	  praise	  Rommel	  for	  not	  killing	  prisoners	  unless	  we	  simultaneously	  refused	  to	  blame	  him	  for	  Hitler’s	  aggressive	  wars.	  For	  otherwise	  he	  is	  a	  criminal,	  and	  all	  the	  fighting	  he	  does	  is	  murder	  or	  attempted	  murder.”	  (Walzer,	  38).	  Indeed	  it	  seems	  that	  odd	  that	  we	  would	  praise	  a	  person	  for	  their	  conduct	  in	  a	  war	  if	  we	  already	  had	  judged	  them	  to	  be	  criminals.	  Even	  though	  he	  was	  a	  high-­‐ranking	  general	  in	  an	  army	  that	  is	  universally	  agreed	  as	  fighting	  for	  an	  unjust	  cause,	  Rommel	  is	  usually	  praised	  for	  his	  conduct	  in	  the	  fighting	  of	  the	  war.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  Rommel’s	  high	  rank	  strengthens	  the	  notion	  that	  violations	  of	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  and	  violations	  of	  just	  in	  bello	  are	  two	  separate	  and	  distinct	  phenomenon,	  as	  it	  would	  not	  make	  sense	  to	  hold	  low	  ranking	  soldiers	  fighting	  in	  morally	  ambiguous	  wars	  responsible	  for	  their	  war,	  when	  we	  don’t	  hold	  a	  high-­‐ranking	  general	  accountable	  for	  what	  is	  clearly	  an	  unjust	  war.	  	   In	  his	  book	  Killing	  in	  War,	  Jeff	  McMahan	  lays	  out	  what	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  widely	  accepted	  criticisms	  to	  Michael	  Walzer’s	  view.	  McMahan	  argues	  that	  the	  principles	  of	  jus	  ad	  
bellum	  and	  jus	  in	  bello	  should	  not	  be	  considered	  separate	  and	  distinct.	  The	  implication	  of	  this	  view	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  moral	  equality	  of	  combatants,	  in	  other	  words,	  soldiers	  on	  either	  sides	  of	  a	  war	  do	  not	  have	  equal	  rights	  to	  shoot	  at	  one	  another.	  Rather	  the	  soldiers	  of	  the	  side	  with	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  are	  morally	  superior	  to	  the	  soldiers	  fighting	  on	  the	  side	  without	  jus	  
ad	  bellum.	  According	  to	  McMahan,	  this	  means	  that	  the	  soldiers	  fighting	  on	  the	  side	  without	  
jus	  ad	  bellum	  are	  doing	  something	  seriously	  wrong,	  akin	  to	  a	  murderer	  murdering	  an	  innocent	  civilian.	  	  	   What	  is	  radical	  about	  McMahan’s	  views	  on	  Just	  War	  Theory	  is	  that	  he	  denies	  the	  logical	  separation	  of	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  and	  jus	  in	  bello.	  In	  the	  traditional	  view	  (and	  Walzer’s	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view)	  of	  Just	  War	  Theory,	  the	  soldier	  fighting	  for	  the	  side	  that	  does	  not	  have	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  does	  not	  do	  anything	  wrong	  by	  killing	  enemy	  combatants,	  so	  long	  as	  he	  does	  so	  according	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  jus	  in	  bello.	  In	  other	  words,	  by	  simply	  fighting	  for	  the	  unjust	  side	  of	  the	  war,	  the	  soldier	  has	  done	  nothing	  wrong.	  McMahan	  rejects	  this	  principle	  outright.	  McMahan	  thinks	  that	  simply	  by	  fighting	  for	  the	  unjust	  side,	  the	  soldier	  has	  done	  something	  seriously	  wrong.	  To	  McMahan,	  a	  soldier	  fighting	  on	  the	  side	  without	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  cannot	  possibly	  satisfy	  the	  constraints	  of	  jus	  in	  bello.	  According	  to	  McMahan,	  there	  are	  almost	  no	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  soldiers	  fighting	  for	  the	  side	  without	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  can	  meet	  the	  discrimination	  principle	  of	  jus	  in	  bello.	  The	  discrimination	  principle	  basically	  says	  that	  you	  are	  only	  allowed	  to	  attack	  and	  kill	  legitimate	  targets.	  According	  to	  Walzer,	  only	  combatants	  are	  legitimate	  targets.	  However,	  according	  to	  Walzer,	  combatants	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  conflict	  are	  legitimate	  targets	  because	  they	  have	  allowed	  themselves	  to	  be	  made	  into	  dangerous	  men.	  In	  the	  traditional	  view	  of	  Just	  War	  Theory,	  combatants	  are	  legitimate	  targets	  while	  civilians	  are	  illegitimate	  targets.	  In	  traditional	  Just	  War	  Theory,	  the	  combatants	  of	  the	  side	  fighting	  with	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  are	  still	  legitimate	  targets	  because	  they	  pose	  a	  danger	  to	  the	  combatants	  of	  the	  side	  without	  jus	  ad	  bellum.	  By	  being	  a	  mortal	  threat	  to	  the	  combatants	  who	  are	  fighting	  without	  jus	  ad	  bellum,	  the	  soldiers	  on	  the	  just	  side	  make	  themselves	  legitimate	  targets,	  as	  are	  the	  unjust	  combatants.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  soldiers	  on	  the	  unjust	  side	  can	  claim	  self-­‐defense	  as	  a	  legitimate	  reason	  to	  shoot	  at	  and	  kill	  their	  enemy	  combatants.	  	  McMahan	  disagrees	  with	  this	  outright.	  To	  McMahan,	  the	  legitimate	  targets	  of	  war	  include	  only	  those	  who	  wrongly	  violate	  the	  rights	  of	  others.	  According	  to	  McMahan,	  this	  includes	  combatants	  and	  even	  some	  civilians	  on	  the	  side	  fighting	  without	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  (if	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the	  citizens	  are	  directly	  contributing	  to	  the	  war	  effort,	  say	  working	  in	  a	  munitions	  factory	  or	  something).	  To	  McMahan,	  civilians	  and	  combatants	  of	  the	  side	  with	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  alike	  are	  not	  legitimate	  targets	  because	  they	  do	  not	  violate	  anybody’s	  rights	  (specifically,	  they	  do	  not	  force	  others	  to	  risk	  their	  own	  lives	  against	  their	  will).	  To	  support	  his	  view,	  McMahan	  draws	  a	  parallel	  between	  the	  just	  combatants	  and	  a	  police	  officer	  shooting	  at	  a	  criminal.	  The	  argument	  is	  that	  if	  there	  is	  a	  criminal	  shooting	  at	  innocent	  people	  and	  a	  police	  officer	  shoots	  at	  the	  criminal	  to	  try	  to	  protect	  them,	  the	  police	  officer	  does	  not	  become	  a	  legitimate	  target	  simply	  because	  he	  is	  placing	  the	  criminal	  in	  danger.	  If	  the	  criminal	  shoots	  and	  kills	  the	  officer,	  he	  cannot	  claim	  that	  what	  he	  did	  was	  morally	  justified	  because	  he	  killed	  the	  officer	  in	  self-­‐defense.	  Even	  though	  he	  was	  a	  mortal	  threat	  to	  the	  criminal,	  the	  officer	  did	  not	  give	  up	  his	  right	  not	  to	  be	  shot	  at	  by	  engaging	  in	  the	  conflict,	  it	  was	  still	  the	  moral	  duty	  of	  the	  criminal	  to	  lay	  down	  his	  arms.	  McMahan	  thinks	  that	  this	  is	  analogous	  to	  soldiers	  fighting	  on	  the	  side	  with	  jus	  ad	  bellum.	  He	  thinks	  that	  even	  though	  they	  are	  placing	  their	  enemy	  combatants	  in	  danger,	  that	  alone	  does	  not	  make	  them	  legitimate	  targets	  and	  thereby	  when	  they	  are	  killed	  by	  an	  enemy	  combatant,	  the	  enemy	  combatant	  has	  violated	  
jus	  in	  bello.	  	  	   Walzer	  would	  disagree	  that	  the	  security	  officer	  case	  is	  analogous	  to	  war	  because	  war	  is	  what	  Walzer	  calls,	  a	  rule	  governed	  activity.	  In	  other	  words,	  because	  there	  are	  rules	  governing	  how	  one	  should	  fight	  once	  they	  are	  engaged	  in	  a	  war	  (jus	  in	  bello),	  it	  must	  be	  permissible	  to	  participate,	  because	  there	  cannot	  be	  permissible	  ways	  of	  doing	  the	  impermissible.	  McMahan	  disagrees	  that	  just	  because	  there	  are	  rules	  of	  jus	  in	  bello,	  that	  there	  is	  moral	  equality	  between	  combatants.	  McMahan	  does	  sympathize	  with	  the	  general	  view	  that	  if	  you	  pose	  a	  threat,	  then	  you	  are	  a	  legitimate	  target,	  however	  he	  does	  not	  agree	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that	  people	  who	  pose	  threats	  are	  necessarily	  combatants.	  McMahan	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  elderly	  professors	  of	  physics	  who	  were	  working	  on	  the	  Manhattan	  Project.	  He	  claims	  that	  even	  though	  nobody	  would	  call	  these	  physicists	  combatants,	  they	  “posed	  a	  far	  greater	  threat	  to	  the	  Japanese	  than	  any	  ordinary	  American	  soldier.”	  (McMahan,	  12).	  McMahan	  then	  gives	  an	  example	  of	  somebody	  who	  is	  technically	  a	  combatant,	  but	  who	  does	  not	  pose	  a	  threat.	  His	  example	  is	  “A	  uniformed	  officer	  who	  serves	  as	  a	  legal	  adviser	  to	  the	  military	  during	  a	  war	  may	  devote	  all	  of	  her	  efforts	  during	  the	  war	  to	  arguing	  that	  certain	  methods	  of	  warfare	  that	  her	  country	  wishes	  to	  use	  are	  illegal.	  She	  may	  spent	  the	  entire	  war	  actively	  
restraining	  her	  country’s	  military	  action,	  thereby	  diminishing	  the	  threat	  of	  her	  side’s	  combatants	  pose	  to	  their	  military	  enemies,	  yet	  she	  is	  almost	  universally	  recognized	  as	  having	  combatant	  status.”	  (McMahan,	  12).	  These	  examples	  clearly	  show	  that	  those	  who	  pose	  a	  threat	  are	  not	  equal	  to	  combatants.	  This	  means	  that	  who	  is	  a	  legitimate	  target	  is	  not	  clearly	  and	  neatly	  divided	  between	  combatants	  and	  noncombatants.	  To	  McMahan,	  the	  issue	  of	  who	  is	  a	  legitimate	  target	  and	  who	  is	  not	  simply	  comes	  down	  to	  who	  has	  violated	  whose	  rights.	  According	  to	  McMahan,	  “those	  who	  fight	  solely	  to	  defend	  themselves	  and	  other	  innocent	  people	  from	  a	  wrongful	  threat	  of	  attack,	  and	  who	  threaten	  no	  one	  but	  the	  wrongful	  aggressors,	  do	  not	  make	  themselves	  morally	  liable	  to	  defensive	  attack.”	  (McMahan,	  14).	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  the	  duty	  of	  the	  aggressor	  to	  stop	  their	  aggressive	  war.	  Just	  because	  they	  are	  being	  fired	  upon	  does	  not	  give	  them	  the	  right	  to	  fire	  back,	  as	  they	  are	  only	  being	  fired	  upon	  because	  they	  are	  violating	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  defenders.	  Part	  of	  Walzer’s	  argument	  for	  the	  moral	  equality	  of	  combatants,	  in	  other	  words,	  why	  it	  is	  permissible	  for	  combatants	  of	  either	  side	  to	  kill	  one	  another	  is	  that	  combatants	  on	  both	  sides	  are	  like	  professional	  boxers,	  who	  waive	  the	  right	  not	  to	  be	  hit.	  He	  argues	  that	  by	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participating	  in	  the	  war	  (more	  specifically,	  wearing	  a	  soldier’s	  uniform),	  one	  waives	  the	  right	  to	  not	  be	  attacked.	  McMahan	  disagrees	  that	  by	  simply	  wearing	  a	  uniform	  (or	  by	  simply	  participating	  in	  a	  war),	  one	  waives	  the	  right	  not	  to	  be	  attacked.	  In	  support	  of	  his	  position,	  McMahan	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  the	  Polish	  army	  in	  1939.	  He	  argues	  that	  just	  because	  Poles	  took	  up	  arms	  to	  try	  to	  defend	  their	  country,	  they	  still	  did	  not	  give	  the	  Nazis	  the	  right	  or	  permission	  to	  attack	  their	  country	  and	  therefore,	  the	  Nazis	  had	  no	  right	  to	  fire	  on	  the	  Poles.	  Instead,	  it	  was	  the	  duty	  of	  the	  Nazi	  soldier	  to	  lay	  down	  their	  arms,	  stop	  their	  aggressive	  war,	  and	  not	  force	  the	  Poles	  to	  give	  up	  their	  right	  to	  life.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  why	  this	  is	  different	  from	  two	  boxers	  mutually	  agreeing	  to	  a	  competition.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  both	  sides,	  by	  joining	  in	  the	  activity,	  agreed	  to	  give	  up	  some	  of	  their	  rights.	  Rather,	  the	  reason	  that	  the	  Poles	  took	  up	  arms	  in	  the	  first	  place	  was	  to	  protect	  their	  rights	  from	  the	  Nazi	  invaders.	  	   The	  practical	  outcome	  of	  all	  of	  this	  is	  that	  McMahan	  thinks	  that	  it	  is	  the	  duty	  of	  a	  soldier	  to	  research	  the	  facts	  of	  any	  war	  before	  they	  consent	  to	  fight	  in	  it	  and	  they	  should	  only	  consent	  to	  fighting	  for	  sides	  that	  have	  jus	  ad	  bellum.	  McMahan	  thinks	  that	  just	  as	  soldiers	  are	  taught	  to	  be	  able	  to	  recognize	  and	  refuse	  to	  participate	  in	  situations,	  which	  would	  violate	  jus	  in	  bello,	  they	  should	  also	  be	  taught	  to	  recognize	  and	  refuse	  to	  participate	  in	  situations	  in	  which	  they	  would	  violate	  jus	  ad	  bellum.	  To	  accomplish	  this,	  McMahan	  thinks	  that	  there	  would	  need	  to	  be	  an	  institutionalized	  protection	  for	  conscientious	  objectors	  as	  well	  as	  an	  international	  World	  Court	  (not	  like	  the	  one	  we	  have	  today	  at	  the	  Hague)	  to	  decide	  which	  side	  of	  a	  struggle,	  if	  either,	  was	  fighting	  with	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  on	  their	  side.	  	   The	  divergent	  views	  of	  Michael	  Walzer	  and	  Jeff	  McMahan	  have	  serious	  real	  world	  implications.	  While	  Walzer’s	  view	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  accepted	  one	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  applied	  in	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the	  world	  today	  (his	  views	  are	  mostly	  in	  line	  with	  the	  UN	  Charter	  and	  other	  tenants	  of	  international	  law	  and	  also,	  his	  view	  of	  the	  moral	  equality	  of	  combatants	  is	  in	  line	  with	  our	  cultural	  norms),	  many	  people’s	  intuitions	  are	  more	  in	  line	  with	  McMahan’s	  point	  of	  view.	  While	  I	  do	  sympathize	  with	  the	  view	  that	  Walzer’s	  view	  let’s	  too	  many	  people	  off	  the	  hook	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  morally	  responsible	  for	  a	  war,	  I	  also	  think	  that	  McMahan’s	  views	  might	  be	  too	  strict	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  potential	  soldier’s	  responsibility	  to	  determine	  what	  is	  and	  participate	  only	  in	  just	  wars.	  	   Walzer’s	  interpretation	  of	  Just	  War	  Theory	  is	  criticized	  for	  letting	  too	  many	  people	  off	  the	  hook	  morally	  for	  committing	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression	  or	  for	  violating	  the	  tenants	  of	  
jus	  ad	  bellum.	  Walzer’s	  strict	  line	  that	  it	  is	  only	  political	  leaders	  who	  are	  guilty	  of	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression	  and	  his	  view	  that	  soldiers	  do	  not	  choose	  to	  fight	  freely,	  but	  rather	  are	  coerced	  by	  various	  social	  pressures	  seem	  to	  justify	  cases	  where	  people	  are	  doing	  something	  seriously	  morally	  wrong.	  According	  to	  Walzer,	  since	  he	  holds	  the	  moral	  equality	  of	  combatants	  as	  absolute,	  a	  person	  who	  becomes	  a	  soldier	  to	  fight	  in	  a	  war	  that	  they	  plainly	  know	  is	  unjust,	  just	  for	  the	  simple	  thrill	  of	  killing	  people	  has	  the	  same	  right	  to	  shoot	  at	  enemy	  soldiers	  for	  fun	  as	  they	  have	  to	  shoot	  at	  him	  to	  protect	  themselves.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  a	  person	  who	  just	  really	  enjoyed	  the	  act	  of	  killing	  became	  a	  soldier	  just	  so	  that	  he	  could	  legally	  satisfy	  his	  bloodlust,	  he	  would	  not	  be	  committing	  any	  sort	  of	  crime	  in	  Walzer’s	  account	  of	  Just	  War	  Theory.	  	   According	  to	  McMahan	  however,	  a	  soldier	  who	  is	  socially	  pressured	  into	  fighting	  for	  a	  war	  which	  he	  thinks	  to	  be	  just	  because	  of	  misinformation	  from	  his	  government	  is	  guilty	  of	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression	  and	  if	  he	  kills	  an	  enemy	  who	  is	  firing	  at	  him,	  he	  should	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  guilty	  of	  a	  serious	  crime.	  This	  view	  would	  have	  the	  consequence	  that	  if	  a	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person	  who	  joined	  the	  army	  because	  they	  were	  in	  dire	  financial	  straits,	  was	  shipped	  off	  to	  a	  war	  to	  try	  to	  feed	  their	  family,	  fired	  upon	  and	  killed	  an	  enemy	  soldier,	  they	  should	  be	  thought	  of	  essentially	  as	  a	  murderer,	  who	  has	  committed	  a	  heinous	  crime.	  This	  view	  would	  have	  the	  implication	  that	  most	  of	  our	  current	  society’s	  actions	  towards	  soldiers	  are	  inappropriate,	  as	  we	  are	  not	  currently	  fighting	  a	  war	  of	  self-­‐defense,	  and	  therefore,	  people	  who	  have	  “support	  our	  troops”	  t	  shirts	  or	  bumper	  stickers	  are	  supporting	  murders.	  In	  fact,	  according	  to	  this	  view	  supporting	  the	  “support	  our	  troops”	  logo	  would	  be	  about	  as	  appropriate	  as	  supporting	  a	  logo	  that	  said	  “support	  Jeffrey	  Dahmer.”	  Also,	  according	  to	  this	  view,	  thousands	  of	  soldiers	  (maybe	  even	  most	  soldiers)	  would	  be	  guilty	  of	  a	  very	  serious	  crime	  and	  should	  be	  dealt	  with	  by	  some	  sort	  of	  new	  form	  of	  international	  court.	  	   As	  neither	  of	  these	  consequences	  seems	  acceptable,	  there	  must	  be	  a	  practical	  way	  to	  determine	  when	  soldiers	  are	  doing	  something	  that	  is	  morally	  justified	  and	  when	  they	  are	  not.	  There	  needs	  to	  be	  some	  way	  to	  determine	  when	  a	  soldier	  is	  fighting	  justly,	  with	  a	  moral	  equality	  among	  combatants,	  and	  when	  a	  soldier	  is	  really	  acting	  more	  like	  a	  murderer	  than	  anything	  else.	  From	  a	  practical	  standpoint,	  I	  think	  that	  a	  reasonable	  solution	  for	  weeding	  out	  people	  who	  want	  to	  fight	  for	  the	  simple	  thrill	  of	  killing	  would	  be	  to	  place	  stricter	  standards	  for	  who	  is	  allowed	  to	  join	  the	  armed	  forces.	  There	  are	  already	  screening	  tests	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  other	  in	  other	  countries	  that	  try	  to	  weed	  out	  these	  people	  from	  joining	  the	  armed	  forces.	  While	  these	  screening	  tests	  are	  obviously	  not	  effective	  100%	  of	  the	  time,	  I	  think	  that	  we	  could	  make	  these	  tests	  rigorous	  enough	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  such	  people	  would	  be	  barred	  from	  joining	  the	  armed	  forces.	  	  From	  an	  intellectual	  standpoint,	  Walzer’s	  claim	  that	  soldiers	  are	  never	  guilty	  of	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression	  seems	  to	  be	  troubling.	  To	  argue	  against	  this	  claim,	  McMahan	  raises	  the	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example	  of	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein.	  Wittgenstein	  was	  a	  very	  famous	  philosopher	  who	  lived	  in	  England	  during	  the	  outbreak	  of	  World	  War	  One,	  and	  thought	  of	  the	  British	  as	  one	  of	  the	  best	  races	  in	  the	  world.	  He	  had	  many	  friends	  fighting	  for	  the	  British	  Army	  in	  World	  War	  One,	  yet	  decided	  to	  enlist	  in	  the	  Austrian	  army	  (he	  was	  Austrian	  by	  birth).	  Wittgenstein’s	  hastiness	  to	  enlist	  was	  motivated	  by	  an	  overriding	  sense	  of	  obligation	  he	  felt	  to	  fight	  for	  his	  mother	  country.	  According	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  sister,	  at	  least	  part	  of	  his	  determination	  to	  fight	  was	  the	  product	  of	  “an	  intense	  desire	  to	  take	  something	  difficult	  upon	  himself	  and	  to	  do	  something	  other	  than	  purely	  intellectual	  work.”	  (McMahan,	  2).	  One	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  biographers,	  Ray	  Monk	  felt	  that	  “Wittgenstein	  felt	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  facing	  death	  would,	  in	  some	  way	  or	  other,	  improve	  him.”	  (McMahan,	  2).	  This	  claim	  was	  backed	  up	  from	  a	  section	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  diary	  which	  he	  kept	  during	  the	  war	  which	  said:	  “Now	  I	  have	  the	  chance	  to	  be	  a	  decent	  human	  being,	  for	  I’m	  standing	  eye	  to	  eye	  with	  death.”	  (McMahan,	  2).	  McMahan	  goes	  on	  to	  make	  the	  case	  that	  World	  War	  One	  was	  a	  perfect	  example	  of	  a	  pointless	  war,	  which	  is	  a	  fairly	  uncontroversial	  claim.	  He	  then	  adds	  that	  the	  Austrians	  were	  perhaps	  the	  most	  culpable	  “of	  all	  the	  participants	  in	  that	  futile	  mass	  slaughter”	  (McMahan,	  2)	  as	  they	  in	  effect	  started	  the	  war.	  McMahan	  then	  criticizes	  Wittgenstein	  for	  fighting	  for	  the	  aggressor	  in	  a	  pointless	  and	  barbaric	  war.	  He	  criticizes	  Wittgenstein	  for	  considering	  killing	  people	  he	  did	  not	  know	  “a	  small	  price	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  elevating	  and	  self-­‐improving	  experience	  of	  risking	  death”	  (McMahan,	  3).	  In	  short,	  McMahan	  is	  accusing	  Wittgenstein	  of	  doing	  something	  seriously	  morally	  wrong	  by	  fighting	  for	  an	  unjust	  participant	  in	  a	  war.	  I	  think	  that	  Walzer	  would	  respond	  to	  this	  claim	  by	  first	  by	  pointing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Wittgenstein	  felt	  an	  overwhelming	  sense	  of	  obligation.	  This	  sense	  of	  obligation	  Walzer	  would	  argue,	  was	  placed	  on	  him	  by	  overwhelming	  societal	  pressures	  (even	  though	  he	  was	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living	  in	  England	  at	  the	  time),	  and	  meant	  that	  he	  could	  not	  truly	  consent	  to	  fight.	  Walzer	  however,	  would	  not	  necessarily	  need	  to	  stick	  to	  this	  claim.	  McMahan	  claims	  that	  “the	  moral	  equality	  of	  soldiers	  is	  also	  compatible	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  combatants	  may	  act	  wrongly	  even	  when	  their	  action	  is	  in	  conformity	  with	  all	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  jus	  in	  bello.	  It	  is,	  for	  example,	  compatible	  with	  the	  Augustinian	  view	  that	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  fight	  with	  an	  attitude	  of	  hatred	  or	  enmity,	  or	  for	  the	  pleasure	  of	  killing.”	  (McMahan,	  4).	  I	  think	  that	  this	  claim	  provides	  an	  acceptable	  defense	  of	  Walzer’s	  point	  of	  view.	  For	  it	  could	  well	  be	  the	  case	  that	  fighting	  for	  misguided	  reasons,	  such	  as	  thinking	  that	  risking	  your	  life	  will	  lead	  to	  self-­‐improvement,	  may	  also	  enable	  a	  combatant	  to	  act	  wrongly	  even	  if	  they	  obey	  the	  tenants	  of	  jus	  in	  bello.	  From	  this	  standpoint,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  soldiers	  like	  Wittgenstein,	  who	  fight	  for	  misguided	  reasons,	  are	  doing	  something	  seriously	  morally	  wrong,	  although	  they	  are	  not	  committing	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression.	  While	  these	  soldiers	  are	  doing	  something	  seriously	  morally	  wrong,	  it	  is	  not	  simply	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  fighting	  on	  behalf	  of	  an	  unjust	  participant	  in	  a	  war,	  but	  rather	  it	  has	  to	  do	  with	  their	  reasons	  for	  fighting.	  The	  case	  of	  an	  excessive	  nationalist	  is	  also	  an	  interesting	  counterexample	  to	  Walzer’s	  claim	  that	  soldiers	  are	  never	  guilty	  of	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression.	  By	  excessive	  nationalist,	  I	  mean	  one	  who	  does	  not	  care	  about	  the	  justification	  of	  self-­‐defense,	  and	  supports	  aggressive	  actions	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  country,	  such	  as	  gaining	  territory,	  or	  expanding	  their	  country’s	  influence	  or	  something.	  However,	  as	  aggression	  is	  being	  defined	  as	  one	  state	  using	  armed	  force	  against	  another	  state	  without	  the	  justification	  of	  self-­‐defense,	  and	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  it	  is	  that	  it	  forces	  people	  to	  fight	  for	  their	  lives	  against	  their	  will,	  I	  think	  that	  Walzer	  can	  safely	  claim	  that	  while	  this	  excessive	  nationalist	  may	  be	  doing	  something	  seriously	  morally	  wrong,	  they	  are	  not	  committing	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression.	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This	  is	  because	  this	  excessive	  nationalist	  cannot	  force	  others	  to	  fight	  for	  their	  own	  life	  against	  their	  will	  without	  war	  being	  declared,	  for	  otherwise,	  they	  are	  just	  simple	  murderers.	  The	  heads	  of	  state	  need	  to	  declare	  their	  aggressive	  war	  before	  this	  excessive	  nationalist	  can	  even	  join	  the	  fight.	  Therefore,	  the	  excessive	  nationalist	  can	  be	  viewed	  in	  a	  similar	  light	  as	  the	  soldier	  who	  enlists	  for	  misguided	  reasons:	  they	  are	  doing	  something	  that	  is	  seriously	  morally	  wrong.	  They	  are	  not	  however,	  guilty	  of	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression,	  as	  they	  are	  only	  allowed	  the	  ability	  to	  fight	  in	  the	  first	  place	  because	  of	  their	  government’s	  decision	  to	  go	  to	  war	  (which	  itself	  is	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression).	  As	  Walzer	  puts	  it,	  “We	  draw	  a	  line	  between	  the	  war	  itself,	  for	  which	  soldiers	  are	  not	  responsible,	  and	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  war,	  for	  which	  they	  are	  responsible,	  at	  least	  within	  their	  own	  sphere	  of	  activity”	  (Walzer,	  38).	  While	  the	  excessive	  nationalist	  is	  surely	  morally	  culpable	  for	  doing	  something	  wrong,	  what	  they	  have	  done	  is	  not	  equal	  to	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression.	  As	  for	  the	  case	  of	  a	  person	  wanting	  to	  go	  to	  war	  simply	  to	  satisfy	  their	  bloodlust,	  I	  think	  that	  we	  can	  say	  that	  they	  are	  doing	  something	  wrong,	  just	  like	  the	  misguided	  nationalist	  above.	  Walzer	  has	  a	  possible	  further	  response	  to	  the	  soldier	  who	  fights	  for	  bloodlust,	  and	  it	  may	  well	  be	  the	  case	  that	  they	  fall	  into	  a	  different	  category	  of	  “soldier”	  than	  either	  the	  misguided	  nationalist	  (Wittgenstein)	  or	  the	  excessive	  nationalist.	  What	  gives	  all	  soldiers	  equal	  standing	  according	  to	  Walzer	  is	  their	  lack	  of	  true	  consent	  to	  go	  to	  war.	  The	  argument	  is	  something	  along	  the	  lines	  of:	  only	  political	  leaders	  are	  to	  blame	  for	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  is	  a	  war.	  In	  a	  war,	  combatants	  kill	  one	  another.	  If	  you	  are	  not	  to	  blame	  for	  killing	  you	  have	  a	  right	  to	  defend	  yourself	  against	  being	  killed.	  Therefore,	  soldiers	  fighting	  for	  unjust	  states	  have	  a	  right	  to	  defend	  themselves	  by	  killing.	  But	  here,	  I	  think	  we	  can	  say	  that	  although	  the	  soldiers	  who	  enlist	  to	  satisfy	  their	  bloodlust	  are	  not	  to	  blame	  for	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whether	  there	  is	  a	  war	  or	  not	  (and	  are	  therefore	  not	  guilty	  of	  aggression),	  we	  can	  still	  blame	  them	  for	  killing.	  This	  is	  because	  they	  are	  more	  like	  the	  mercenary,	  who	  enlists	  for	  some	  personal	  gain	  or	  benefit	  than	  a	  soldier	  who	  is	  coerced	  into	  the	  position.	  They	  joined	  the	  war	  not	  out	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  duty,	  but	  out	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  want	  (of	  not	  some	  common	  good	  like	  patriotism,	  but	  rather	  selfish	  reasons),	  which	  I	  think	  makes	  them	  responsible	  for	  their	  killings.	  These	  people	  truly	  should	  be	  considered	  murderers,	  although	  I	  still	  think	  that	  they	  are	  not	  guilty	  of	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression.	  Wittgenstein	  could	  also	  partially	  fall	  under	  this	  category,	  but	  he	  is	  a	  murkier	  case,	  as	  he	  enlisted	  due	  to	  a	  combination	  of	  a	  great	  sense	  of	  duty,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  hopes	  of	  personal	  gain.	  	   As	  for	  the	  matter	  of	  punishing	  combatants	  who	  are	  fighting	  without	  jus	  ad	  bellum	  for	  crimes	  akin	  to	  murder,	  I	  simply	  do	  not	  think	  that	  it	  is	  practically	  possible.	  I	  think	  that	  if	  this	  policy	  were	  implemented,	  there	  would	  be	  a	  great	  lack	  of	  soldiers,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  it	  may	  even	  prevent	  an	  army	  from	  being	  able	  to	  fight	  a	  just	  war.	  First	  of	  all,	  if	  this	  policy	  were	  implemented,	  I	  think	  that	  there	  would	  be	  a	  drastic	  decrease	  in	  the	  number	  of	  volunteers	  who	  join	  the	  armed	  forces	  which	  would	  mean	  that	  if	  there	  were	  a	  case	  where	  a	  just	  war	  needed	  to	  be	  fought,	  there	  would	  have	  to	  be	  a	  draft	  to	  scramble	  up	  enough	  soldiers	  to	  fight.	  I	  think	  that	  it	  is	  fairly	  uncontroversial	  to	  claim	  that	  all	  involved	  parties	  are	  better	  off	  if	  people,	  who	  are	  inspired	  to	  do	  so	  for	  any	  number	  of	  reasons,	  volunteer	  to	  join	  the	  armed	  forces	  and	  are	  trained	  and	  wait	  ready	  in	  the	  reserves	  to	  fight	  a	  just	  war,	  than	  if	  a	  war	  arises,	  and	  people	  are	  drafted	  randomly	  from	  the	  population,	  who	  then	  have	  to	  be	  trained	  to	  fight	  before	  they	  can	  be	  shipped	  off	  to	  a	  war	  that	  they	  are	  forced	  into.	  Also,	  this	  policy	  may	  well	  discourage	  even	  just	  combatants	  from	  wanting	  to	  fight,	  as	  it	  might	  make	  soldiers	  weary	  of	  always	  looking	  over	  their	  shoulder	  so	  to	  speak,	  fearing	  that	  somebody	  will	  accuse	  them	  of	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being	  unjust	  combatants	  so	  that	  they	  will	  be	  dragged	  into	  a	  long	  trail	  process,	  and	  might	  even	  be	  wrongly	  convicted	  of	  murder.	  In	  short,	  I	  think	  that	  the	  moral	  equality	  of	  combatants	  is	  something	  that	  must	  be	  maintained	  in	  order	  for	  just	  wars	  to	  be	  able	  to	  be	  fought.	  	   Overall,	  I	  think	  that	  Walzer’s	  account	  of	  Just	  War	  Theory	  is	  the	  superior	  one.	  While	  his	  ideas	  are	  more	  controversial,	  they	  are	  also	  more	  in-­‐line	  with	  the	  way	  that	  our	  society	  is	  set	  up	  and	  functions.	  Although	  many	  people,	  are	  sympathetic	  with	  McMahan’s	  account,	  I	  think	  that	  the	  moral	  equality	  of	  combatants	  is	  a	  must	  for	  wars	  to	  be	  fought	  at	  all.	  I	  also	  think	  that	  there	  should	  be	  immunity	  of	  noncombatants	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  war,	  which	  McMahan	  does	  not	  hold.	  Also,	  I	  do	  truly	  think	  that	  soldiers,	  while	  they	  may	  act	  impermissibly	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways,	  are	  never	  guilty	  of	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression.	  Overall,	  I	  think	  that	  understanding	  the	  discrepancies	  in	  the	  possible	  accounts	  of	  Just	  War	  Theory	  are	  vital	  for	  every	  person	  to	  know,	  as	  war	  is	  such	  a	  pervasive	  force	  in	  our	  world,	  that	  deeply	  alters	  the	  lives	  of	  millions	  of	  people	  annually	  and	  it	  is	  important	  to	  know	  whether	  or	  not	  one’s	  actions	  in	  such	  an	  important	  event	  are	  just	  or	  not.	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